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i
introduction
Decentralization in government authority allows for 
a more direct participation of the local population in 
cultural, economic and political decision making. Peo­
ple in cities, towns and villages are much more in­
terested in solving their own regional problems than is 
a remote and impersonal central bureaucracy. The 
greater the decentralization of the public sector, 
therefore, the fuller the participation of citizenry in the 
process of decision making and the greater the ef­
ficiency in solving regional and local problems. 
However, in order for the local authorities to be able 
to perform such functions effectively, they need the re­
quired financial resources.
Certain functions now performed by the central 
government could easily be delegated to local 
authorities. This would facilitate decentralization, 
reduce central government bureaucracy and provide a 
source of revenue for the local authorities. A recent 
authorization of the municipalities and communities in 
the countryside to issue housing permits, for example, 
seems to be an appropriate step in the right direction. 
The permit fees will now go where they belong; i.e. to 
the local authorities and not the central government.
By the same token, great centralization in govern­
ment authority involves, among other things, greater 
inefficiency and waste of valuable resources. The slow- 
moving central government bureaucracy is usually un­
able to conceive and implement efficiently projects of 
local importance. Most of the times, the dead-head of 
the central government acts as a drawback to the 
developmental efforts of those immediately involved at 
the local level. More often than not, the central 
bureaucrats fail to see and understand the real needs 
of specific regions and communities. This explains, to 
a great extent, their propensity to embark on highly 
wasteful «prestigeous projects» which have little to do 
with the real needs and aspirations of the people. It seems, 
therefore, that inefficiency goes hand in hand with 
government centralization. Moreover, centralization 
leads to the suffocation of individual and collective 
initiative at the regional and local levels and encoura­
ges corruption at high levels of government.
The purpose of this paper is threefold: First, it com­
pares the size of central and local governments in 
Greece and the four largest countries of the EEC. Sec­
ond, it. reveals the trends in these forms of government 
during the post-war years. Finally, it attempts to point 
out the implications of those trends. Expenditures of 
different levels of government are used for this pur­
pose.
the evidence
Despite growing criticism against central govern­
ment expansion, Greece seems to continue to follow
— We aknowledge our indebtedness to professors Ernest Bloch, 
Peter Albin. Joan Hoffman and Const. Papoulias for their 
helpful comments.
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the path of greater centralization. The tendency 
becomes evident when one looks at the relative 
magnitudes of central versus state and local govern 
ment expenditures. While central government expen­
ditures. as a proportion of general government expen­
ditures. increased significantly during the post-war 
period, those of the local government declined at a 
steady rate. Moreover, the gap in the relative size of 
these two forms of government tended to widen during 
the last two decades.
As Figure 1 shows, central government expenditures 
increased from 62 percent of total public expenditures 
in 1960, to almost 70 percent in 1978. In the year 
1976 alone, central government expenditures account­
ed for 73 percent of total public expenditures, an in­
crease of 18 percent between 1960 and 1976.
On the other hand, as can be seen in Figure 1, the 
share of state and local government expenditures in 
general government declined from 16 percent in 1960 
to 9 percent in 1978. Thus, although there has been a 
slight improvement in the trend from 1975 onwards, 
the relative share of local government expenditures has 
decreased by 40 percent between 1960 and 1978. 
Such sizeable changes in the relative shares of local 
and state government on the one hand and central 
government on the other, explain the widening gap 
between those two forms of government in Greece.
In sharp contrast to what is happening in Greece, 
decentralization trends continue and local governments 
are strengthened in the four largest EEC countries, that 
is. in France. Germany, Italy, and the United King­
dom. As Figure 2 indicates, the share of central 
government in the four EEC countries taken together, 
declined from 58 percent in 1960 to 55 percent in 
1977. The exceptionally high value of the relative 
share for 1978 is certainly due to the abnormally high 
figure for Italy in the same year.
At the local government front, the comparison bet­
ween Greece and the four EEC countries points to a 
more dramatic diversion. Thus, while the share of 
local government in general government declined 
rather significantly in Greece, it increased from 21 per­
cent to 26 percent in the EEC countries, between 1960 
and 1978. The trends in central government, on the 
other hand, followed opposite directions for the 
greatest part of the period. This can be readily seen in 
Figure 3.
Similar messages are conveyed when one considers 
the elasticity of state and local government expen­
ditures with respect to general government expen­
ditures.
As can be seen from Table 1, the elasticity for 
Greece was considerably less than one for all the time 
intervals considered, except for the period 1975-1978 
when it was just about one. This is in sharp contrast 
to the other EEC countries where the elasticity of 
local and state government expenditures with respect 
to general government was either very close to one or 
considerably greater. The only exception is that of
TABLE 1. Elasticity of State and Local Government Expenditures 
with Respect to General Government Expenditures: 
Greece and the Rest of EEC
Country/ Greece 
year
France Germany Italy UK A/EEC
1960-65 0.49 0.94 0.98 0.87 1.5 1.1
1965-70 0.97 1.02 1.06 0.93 1.4 l.l
1970-75 0.62 0.50 0.94 1.5 1.1 1.0
1975-78 1.07 1.08 0.99 0.95 0.68 0.92
1960-78 0.55 1.09 1.02 1.17 1.20 1.12
Source: OECD,
Various
National
Issues.
Accounts of the OECD Countries,
France, and for the limited period of time between 
1970 and 1975, when the elasticity was 0.50.
In summary form: When the elasticity is estimated 
over the entire period from 1960 to 1978, it is seen 
that it is very low (0.55) for Greece, and well above 
one for the other EEC countries. This is also true 
when the EEC countries are taken together. The aver­
age elasticity of the four EEC countries, for the entire 
period, is 1.12 compared to a very low 0.55 for 
Greece. The standard interpretation of these values for 
the elasticity is straightforward: The figures imply that, 
on the average and for the entire period, when general 
government expenditures were increasing by 1 percent 
in the EEC countries, the state and local government 
expenditures were increasing by 1.12 percent. In 
Greece, however, to an increase in general government 
size of 1 percent there corresponded an increase in 
local government size of only 0.55 percent! A great 
contrast indeed.
the implications
The main reason for the centralization observed in 
Greece, contrary to what happens in the EEC and 
other countries, is the deprivation of local authorities 
from tax revenues even from some of their own ser­
vices. To meet their expenses, local governments i.e. 
municipality and community authorities depend, to a 
large extent, on central government hand-outs. This is 
in contrast to what happens in other countries where 
state and local governments depend, primarily, on 
their own tax revenues. These revenues are basically 
collected from property-income taxes and sales taxes. 
In Greece, on the other hand, the main part of the lim­
ited municipal and community revenues comes from 
the provision of certain services e.g. sanitation, 
cemeteries, sidewalk leasing etc.
A good part of such revenues is collected along 
with the electricity bills by the Public Power Corpora­
tion. More specifically: About 57 percent of the total 
revenue of local government comes from «other 
subsectors of general government»; 21 percent from 
«property income receivable»; 16 percent from «in­
direct taxes»; and 6 percent from «direct taxes».
It should also be noted here, that in other coun­
tries a wide variety of additional services are offered
22
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by the local authorities. Those services include elemen­
tary, secondary and (in the case of New York City) 
higher education; police and fire protection; hospital 
care and mass transportation facilities, as well as court 
functions. It is expected, therefore, that higher levels of 
revenue will be needed in order for the local 
authorities to finance these additional services. From a 
sociopolitical point of view, such extensive delegation 
of power to local authorities would diffuse decision­
making to more people and strengthen the democratic 
institutions.
It is paradoxical that even in some socialist or cen­
trally planned countries the trend is towards more 
decentralization, while the opposite is true for Greece. 
In neighboring Yugoslavia, for example, central 
government expenditures and revenues declined 
significantly in the 1960s and 1970s in favor of «com­
munities of interest» and «special funds» for public 
works.1 At the same time, the centralization trend con­
tinued in Greece and there are no signs in the horizon for 
the reversal of his trend.
Furthermore, it can reasonably be expected that, in 
Greece, central government transfers to local govern­
ments will be under pressure of reduction in the future. 
There are several factors working in that direction: 
For one thing, a reduction in tariffs on imports, to 
about half their present levels, is expected in the years 
ahead. Presently, tariffs represent about 22 percent of 
the value of imports. Flowever, they are expected to be 
reduced to 10-12 percent, as a result of Greece’s ac­
cession to the Common Market and the harmonization 
of her trade and tax policies.
These expectations are substantiated by our recent 
empirical research. Indirect taxes and primarily tariffs, 
which depend more on imports than private consump­
tion and inflation are far higher in Greece than the
1. For comparisons see: N.V. Gianaris, The Economies of the 
Balkan Countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey,
Yugoslavia: (New York, Praeger 1981), ch. 5.
EEC. A simple regression analysis, for the period 
1950-78, reveals that the regression coefficients of in­
direct taxes on imports were 0.57 for Greece and 0.45 
for the EEC. On the other hand, a logarithmic mul­
tivariate analysis of indirect taxes on private consump­
tion, imports, and inflation generated the values of 
0.36 and 0.26, respectively, for the same regression 
coefficients. In both cases the fit of the regressions 
was very good (R2> 0.925).2
Moreover, as a result of Greece’s membership to the 
EEC, the introduction of value added tax by the end 
of 1983, will most probably generate less tax revenues 
than the present turnover and other taxes. The reason 
is that Greece’s industrial sector is not as advanced as 
that of the EEC and, therefore, the production stages 
for which taxes are collected are not as many. On the 
other hand, for the imported commodities, Greece will 
collect value added taxes only for the final retail stages 
while the exporting countries will reap most of the 
taxes for the intermediate stages of production.
It becomes evident therefore, that Greece might be 
forced to introduce sizeable sales taxes—to the degree 
permitted by the EEC agreements—and/or massive 
direct income and property taxes. This will be 
necessary in order to keep revenues at the same levels 
or (more realistically) increase them equiproportionally 
to the expected increase in central and local govern­
ment expenditures. The alternative for Greece would 
be growing budgetary deficits the financing of which 
would lead to more inflation.
In either case, the prospects for local government 
finance and decentralization do not seem to be bright, 
unless determined political action is undertaken rapidly 
by the new government.
2. For details see: N.V. Gianaris, «Public Finance: Greece and 
the EEC», SPOUDAI, January-March 1980, pp. 1-11; and his, 
«Indirect Taxes: A Comparative Study of Greece and the EEC», 
European Economic Review, voi. 15, 1981, pp. iii-7.
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